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FEDERAL COURT INTERFERENCE WITH STATE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS-SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The United States Supreme Court recently decided six cases1 in which
it reaffirmed the historic concept of federalism and upheld the right of state
courts to conduct proceedings free from federal court interference. In these
decisions the Court clarified, in some respects, a previously vague standard
employed by federal courts to determine whether injunctions against state
criminal actions should be granted. Equally important were the issues that
the decisions left unresolved.
BACKGROUND

Historically, Congress has severely limited the power of federal courts
to enjoin state court proceedings.2 Original legislation in 1793 absolutely
prohibited federal court stays of state court actions. 3 Although Congress
has grafted exceptions into the law 4 the legislative restriction has remained
relatively unchanged.5
Supreme Court decisions indicate a parallel tendency to judicially restrict the use of federal court injunctions to halt state court proceedings .6
The 1908 landmark case of Ex parte Young7 established the power of federal
courts to enjoin threatened criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional
state laws.8 The Court, however, limited injunctive relief to exceptional
circumstances in which the defense of state action would not afford an
adequate opportunity to vindicate a federal constitutional claimY
Since Ex parte Young the Supreme Court has attempted to strike a
balance among the notions of federalism, comity, abstention, and the
protection of individual constitutional rights. 10 In Douglas v. City of

1. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). A seventh decision, Fernandez v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), was handed down in a companion case to Samuels v. Mackell.
2.

J. MooRE, A.

VESTAL

9:

P. KURLAND,

FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE

§2.01

(1971)

[hereinafter cited as MOORE]; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §47 (2d ed. 1970).
3. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, §5, 1 Stat. 334.
4. From 1793 to the present there have been only 3 statutory exceptions to the prohibitory language of the Act: "(1) except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress; (2)
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction; (3) to protect or effectuate its judgment." Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43, quoting from 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1970). For a complete discussion
of specific statutes that fall under these exceptions see MOORE, supra note 2, §§2.03-.06;
Note, Federal Power To Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. REV. 726, 727-30
(1961).
5. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, §47; Comment, Courts-Federal Anti-injunction Statute,
28 U.S.C. §2283, Gives Way to Compelling Interests of First Amendment Rights, 45 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 360, 361-62 (1970).
6. MOORE, supra note 2, §2.01.
7. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
8. Id. at 148.
9. Id. at 145-48.
10. For a discussion of the relation of these concepts to federal equitable relief against
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Jeannette" the Court refused to enjoin future prosecution under a state
statute previously declared unconstitutional on its face. 2 The majority
stated the well established prerequisite for injunctive relief:13
[T]he arrest by the federal courts of the processes of the criminal law
within the states, and the determination of questions of criminal
liability under state law by a federal court of equity, are to be supported only on a showing of danger of irreparable injury both great
and immediate.
In 1965 the Court handed down its now celebrated opinion in Dombrowski v. Pfister.4 Petitioners' arrests under the Louisiana Subversive
Activities and Communist Control laws had been quashed by a state court
on the basis of an illegal search and seizure. Petitioners, officials of a Negro
civil rights organization, then sought declaratory and injunctory relief under
the Civil Rights Act 5 against Louisiana officials. Petitioners contended that
the state had continued to threaten prosecutions under these laws in order
to harass them and prevent the free exercise of their first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court reversed the three-judge district court, which had denied
injunctive relief, 0 and held that the existence of a penal statute that was
susceptible of sweeping and improper application had a chilling effect on
first amendment rights. 7
The existence of bad faith prosecutions in the facts of Dombrowski satisfied the irreparable injury test of Douglas and clearly justified the grant of
injunctive relief under traditional principles. However, the Court's opinion
suffered from the same vagueness and overbreadth as the statute it had
ruled upon. Although the Dombrowski court discussed bad faith harassment at some length,' 8 the decision appeared to turn on a new standard,
the "chilling effect"' 9 on freedom of expression resulting from a vague or
overbroad statute.20 Thus, the question became: Was bad faith necessary
to the Dombrowski decision or was a chilling effect enough to warrant federal
2
injunctive relief? '

state actions see Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The

Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 535, 537-52 (1970).
11. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
12. Id. at 165.
13. Id. at 163-64.
14. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
16. 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964).
17. 380 U.S. at 487-89.
18. Id. at 486-89.
19. See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUm. L. Rav. 808
(1969).
20. Id. at 811.
21. Carey, Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Prosecutions, 56 MAss. L.Q. 11,
13 (1971). Other questions arose from the Dombrowski opinion. Since the facts involved
a threatened prosecution, could the decision extend to pending state criminal prosecutions?

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/10

2

Batsel: Federal
Court Interference
with
State
Criminal Procedings--Some
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol. XXIV R
After Dombrowski, confusion reigned among lower federal courts confronted with pleas from state court criminal defendants for injunctive
relief.22 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions seemed to support a narrow
interpretation of Dombrowski that would limit the use of injunctive relief to
situations involving bad faith prosecutions under patently unconstitutional
statutes. 23 However, some lower courts gave full force to the chilling effect
2
standard by granting injunctions in cases absent allegations of bad faith. 4
The confusion resulting from these decisions confronted the high court in
the instant cases.
BAD

FAITH,

FLAGRANTLY

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTES,

AND

MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS
2
In Younger v. Harris
a defendant being prosecuted under the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act filed suit in federal district court to enjoin the
district attorney's action. He contended the law was unconstitutional on its
face and inhibited his exercise of first amendment rights. A three-judge
district court, relying on Dombrowski, enjoined the pending state criminal
proceedings after holding the act void for vagueness and overbreadth.26 The
Supreme Court reversed and held that Dombrowski did not substantially
broaden the availability of federal court injunctions against state criminal
prosecutions. 2 7 The Court stated that such proceedings will not be enjoined
by federal courts absent a great and immediate danger of irreparable injury.2 1
Younger eliminated much of the confusion caused by Dombrowski by
rejecting the chilling effect test as constituting the required irreparable injury.

Could there be situations in which declaratory relief should be granted even though injunctive relief was not proper? Were vagueness and overbreadth to be afforded the same
status, or was vagueness to be treated differently? Could the decision be expanded beyond
freedom of expression to other constitutional guarantees? See Maraist, supra note 10, at 568.
22. Some courts ruled that Dombrowski applied either to bad faith prosecutions or
statutes unconstitutional on their face. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935
(W.D.N.C. 1969); Rollins v. Shannon, 292 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1968), vacated, 401 U.S.
988 (1971); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Landry v.
Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa.
1968); Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ill. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 220
(1968). Other courts granted injunctive relief only if the statute in question was found to be
unconstitutional on its face. See, e.g., University Comm. To End the War in Viet Nam v.
Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1968), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 383 (1970); Smith v.
Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968). Some other courts interpreted Dombrowski to require a finding of bad faith prosecutions. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th
Cir. 1965); Dawkins v. Green, 285 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Fla. 1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 644 (5th
Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Lee, 281 F. Supp. 650 (D. Conn. 1968). For a discussion of the effect
of Dombrowski on lower federal courts see Maraist, supra note 10, at 568-85.
23. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson [II], 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241 (1967); Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
24. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1967);
Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 373 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
25. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
26. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
27. 401 U.S. at 50.
28. Id. at 53-54.
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Recognizing the vagueness of the Dombrowski opinion the Court found the
language supporting a chilling effect interpretation unnecessary to that de29
cision.
The Court determined that a chilling effect does not warrant federal
intervention because such an effect cannot be satisfactorily eliminated by
injunctive relief.3 0 Moreover, the existence of a chilling effect has never
been considered a sufficient basis for prohibiting state action.31 A more
basic consideration was found in the historic function of the federal judiciary
to determine the constitutionality of laws only in cases of actual controversy.3 2 A federal court's responsibility "does not amount to an unlimited
power to survey the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the
courts are called upon to enforce them."3 3 Thus, a chilling effect test would
grant federal courts a power reserved by the state legislatures.
On the facts, two distinctions required a different result in Younger
than in Dombrowski. In Younger a state action was pending in which the
defendant could assert his constitutional claims while in Dombrowski future
prosecutions were threatened. Additionally, in Younger no allegations were
made of bad faith harassment or multiple prosecutions, constituting the
requisite irreparable injury. The defendant's injury was only that which is
common to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.
As justification for its restriction of the irreparable injury standard, the
majority34 referred to the longstanding public policy permitting state courts
to try cases free from federal court interference. 35 The irreparable injury
test, which has been continually reaffirmed in cases involving threatened
prosecutions,38 is the lone judicial exception to this policy. However,

29. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971). "It is undoubtedly true . . . that [a]

criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables
and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Id. This sort of chilling effect does not justify federal court intervention. Id.

30. Id. An injunction does not effectively eliminate uncertainty as to the coverage of
a state statute and leaves most citizens with the same doubts as before. Id.
31. Id. at 51-53.
32. Id. at 52-53.
33. Id. at 52.
34. Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized the wisdom of the Dombrowski opinion in his
dissent. Special circumstances exist whenever a state statute sought to be enforced is unconstitutional on its face. Such a view is necessary for the Court to fulfill its responsibility
to prevent an erosion of individual constitutional rights. The prohibitive nature of the
anti-injunction statute (28 U.S.C. §2283) was the early view of American federalism. The
Reconstruction civil rights statutes express the modern view. Therefore, neither traditional
principles nor the present anti-injunction statute should bar a federal injunction under

the Younger facts. Additionally, 42 U.S.C. §1983 is viewed by Douglas as an express exception to the anti-injunction law. Id. at 58-65 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Primary sources of this policy are plain.
Equity jurisprudence demands that such courts should not act when the moving party has
an adequate remedy at law. Similarly, the notion of comity requires proper respect for

state functions. Id. at 44. Therefore, the usual result when federal courts are asked to
enjoin pending state prosecutions is to refuse to issue the injunction. Id. at 45.
36. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313
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"[c]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience
of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution 37 are not considered irreparable.
Although a showing of irreparable injury usually requires bad faith
prosecutions,3 the Court stated that other exceptional circumstances might
warrant equitable relief. s9 For example, the application of a statute "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it"4 ° may constitute the requisite ir-

reparable injury. Furthermore, the Court impliedly readopted multiple
prosecutions as a ground for injunctive relief. 41 The Younger decision, there-

fore, recognizes three categories of circumstances that warrant federal intervention against state criminal actions: bad faith harassment, flagrantly unconstitutional statutes, and multiple prosecutions.
Although Younger clearly recognized bad faith harassment to constitute
sufficient irreparable injury to warrant federal interference with state action,
the Supreme Court in two recent cases failed to define what state conduct
would support an allegation of bad faith. In Boyle v. Landry42 plaintiffs
claimed that arrests of members of the Negro community had been made
without probable cause under unconstitutional statutes. They further contended that defendants had threatened to enforce other unconstitutional
statutes for the sole purpose of harassing and intimidating Negroes. The
Court did not determine the merits of these allegations, 4s but found the
claims "amount to nothing more than speculation about the future." 44 In
Dyson v. Stein 45 plaintiff, a publisher, was arrested and his newspapers
seized under an allegedly unconstitutional obscenity statute. Plaintiff sought
to enjoin the arrest and seizure of his property, which had occurred without
a prior determination of obscenity. Like Boyle this case was decided on a
procedural ground 46 but the concurring opinion espoused a belief that the
U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co.

v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
37. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
38. Id. at 48-49, 53.
39. Id. at 53-54.
40. Id.
41. The Court stated that "the threat to the plaintiffs' federally protected rights must
be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)
point see Carey, supra note 21, at 23.

(emphasis added). For further discussion of this

42. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
43. As the case came to the Court the only issue to be determined was whether the

district court properly declared unconstitutional and enjoined one subsection of an intimidation statute. Id. at 80.
44. Id. at 81.
45. 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
46. The district court's holding that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and
thus warranted injunctive and declaratory relief was based on a broad interpretation of Dombrowski. Since no findings of irreparable injury based on Younger had been made by the
lower court, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of those
decisions. Id. at 203.
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police conduct constituted bad faith and harassment. 47
Thus, uncertainty exists whether tactics less harassing than the Dombrowski conduct would fulfill the bad faith requirement. The Court has
recognized that prosecutors are presumed to bring actions in good faith,
even if the applicable law is unconstitutional on its face. 48 One commentator has suggested that the necessity for showing subjective intent and a
predetermined plan would make bad faith conduct difficult to prove in most
cases. 40 The Court has not defined a bad faith test, but the "general contours
of the category are plain." 50 The question is one of fact and should be left
to the discretion of federal district judges.
Flagrantly unconstitutional statutes also constitute extraordinary circumstances that warrant injunctive relief.51 According to one authority, this
category seems meaningless as a test for irreparable injury, since such
statutes are extremely rare. 52 The significance of this standard may be found
in what the category does not include. The holding in Younger would exclude vague or overly broad statutes from the category of overtly unconstitutional statutes. Practically speaking, the Court's rejection of a chilling
effect standard implies that no statute, irrespective of its constitutionality,
will warrant equitable relief absent other prejudicial circumstances.
Multiple prosecutions were involved in three cases, but the Court avoided
this issue in each of them.5 3 It seems reasonable that a state criminal defendant should not have to wait until multiple prosecutions occur before
seeking federal relief. The scope of the category should therefore be left to
the discretion of federal district courts.
THE

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF EQUATION

In Samuels v. Mackell- the plaintiff, who had been indicted under a state
criminal anarchy statute, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
an allegedly unconstitutional law. The district court held the statute constitutional and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Supreme Court, relying on Younger, denied injunctive relief. On the issue of declaratory relief

47. Id. at 204.
48. "[O]rdinarily, there should be no interference with such officers; primarily, they
are charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State and
must decide when and how this is to be done." Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44
(1926). "No person is immune from prosecution in good faith for his alleged criminal acts.
Its imminence, even though alleged to be in violation of constitutional guaranties [sic] is
not ground for equity relief since the lawfulness or constitutionality of the statute or
ordinance on which the prosecution is based may be determined as readily in the criminal
case as in a suit for an injunction." Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
49. See Carey, supra note 21, at 20.
50. See Carey, supra note 21, at 22.
51. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
52. See Carey, supra note 21, at 22.
53. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
54. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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the Court stated: "The question presented here is whether under ordinary
circumstances the same considerations that require the withholding of injunctive relief will make declaratory relief equally inappropriate." 55 Answering in the affirmative, the Court denied a declaratory judgment without
considering the merits of the constitutional claims.56
This denial of declaratory relief was based on two considerations. First,
although declaratory relief is a statutory remedy, it is "essentially an equitable
cause of action." 57 Moreover, congressional intent in the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act 58 contemplated that courts would grant or withhold relief on
equitable principles. 59 Under the Act, declaratory relief issued while state
court actions are pending might result in a subsequent injunction to protect
or effectuate the judgment. 6
Justice Brennan's opinion in Perez v. Ledesma,61 by contending that
declaratory judgments and injunctions are essentially dissimilar, 62 rebuts the
majority argument in Samuels. A declaration of unconstitutionality does not
bar all prosecutions under a state statute as would a broad injunction.
Additionally, the issuance of an injunction depends on traditional standards
and will not necessarily be issued as a matter of course to implement declara3
tory judgments.6
The Samuels majority relied on Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman 64 in which
a group of employers sought a declaratory judgment that a state unemployment compensation law was unconstitutional. In Great Lakes the Court
affirmed a lower court's dismissal of the complaint "solely on the ground
that, in the appropriate exercise of the court's discretion, relief by way of a
declaratory judgment should have been denied without consideration of the
merits." 65 Although Great Lakes did not involve state criminal actions, the
Court in Samuels saw no relevant difference in cases where the criminal
proceeding was begun prior to the federal civil suit. The Samuels Court
asserted that "the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should be
66
judged by essentially the same standards."
The impact of the Samuels equation of declaratory and injunctive relief
is uncertain. It is noteworthy that the holding applies only to pending state
prosecutions. Justice Brennan's arguments appear to be valid and he persuasively advocates in Perez that the decision not be extended to future
prosecutions.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 69.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 70.
28 U.S.C. §§2201-02 (1970).
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 70 (1971).
Id. at 72.
401 U.S. 82 (1971).
Id. at 122-23 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
319 U.S. 293 (1943).
Id. at 301-02.
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).
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CONCLUSION

The holdings in these six cases establish that when a state prosecution is
pending, a federal suit claiming that a state statute is vague or overly broad
on its face in violation of first amendment rights will not warrant federal
intervention by injunctive or declaratory relief. The Court expressly stated
that the decisions apply only to cases in which a state criminal prosecution is
pending at the time the federal suit is instituted.7 Younger rejected a broad
interpretation of Dombrowski but failed to indicate whether its interpretation extended to threatened prosecutions. It seems reasonable that future
state actions should require the same extraordinary circumstances as pending state actions to justify equitable relief. However, the specific effect of
Younger on threatened state prosecutions is not known and will have to be
clarified in subsequent opinions.
Since the holdings in Younger and its progenies were based on traditional
principles for granting federal equitable relief, the Court did not decide
whether the anti-injunction statute is an independent bar to federal intervention in pending state actions.68 Nor did the Court express a view on the
federal civil rights cause of action statute69 as an express congressional exception to the and-injunction statute.7 0 The Court may be waiting for legislative reform in this area.71
Finally, the Court's reaffirmation of traditional equitable principles and
its narrow interpretation of Dombrowski have reversed a trend transferring
substantial power from state to federal courts. Thus, the Court has, in a
piecemeal fashion, upheld the concept of judicial balance envisioned by the
framers of the Constitution.
CHARLES

Guy BATsEL

67. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). "We express no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state
courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun." Id. Justice Stewart also notes in his
concurring opinion that there are three issues the Younger decision does not resolve: (1)
the independent force of the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283; (2) whether federal
court injunctive or declaratory relief is proper in cases involving future state criminal
prosecutions, and (3) whether 42 U.S.C. §1983 is an "express exception" to the federal
anti-injunction statute. Id. at 55.
68. Id. at 54. "[We have no occasion to consider whether 28 U.S.C. §2283, which prohibits an injunction against state court proceedings 'except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress' would in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case." Id.
69. 42 US.C. §1983 (1964).
70. See note 67 supra.
71. See Carey, supranote 21, at 26-28.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/10

8

